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Abstract
‘Monkey see, monkey do’ is an old saying referring to imitating another's actions
without necessarily understanding the underlying motivations or being concerned
about consequences, such as propagating harmful behaviors. This study examines
the likelihood of firms imitating and proliferating others’ unethical, irresponsible practices thereby exacerbating harmful effects among even more firms; in doing so, irresponsible contagions can rapidly spread more broadly, negatively affecting even
more consumers. Building upon rivalry-and information-based imitation theories, we
examine if harmful behaviors of others, in combination with misbehavior of referent
firms, influences the likelihood of a firm to engage in irresponsible consumer-related
practices. After examining 25,824 firm-year observations over 12 years, our findings
suggest that imitation of harmful product-related behavior occurs; with size an important factor related to proliferation of harmful behaviors. Testing the model against a
holdout sample finds 94% accuracy. Implications for scholars, managers, and policy
makers are explored.
KEYWORDS

corporate social irresponsibility, customer, empirical analysis, information-based imitation,
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I NTRO D U C TI O N

Why do corporations engage in harmful, unethical behavior toward
essential stakeholders and, importantly, proliferate bad behaviors

After PPG, owner of the Glidden paint brand, introduced a zero vol-

of others' irresponsible practices? We theorize that the mimicry of

atile organic compounds (VOC) product in the mid-1990s, all other

others' behaviors reduces uncertainty even if imitation propagates

major paint companies, facing an imminent threat of federal regu-

irresponsible consumer behaviors. These irresponsible behaviors

lations, followed PPG's lead by offering a version of a zero-VOC,

include actions that violate normative or regulatory standards, such

eco-friendly product (Esposito, 2005). Corporate compliance with

as selling harmful products, deceptive advertising, or other misinfor-

VOC regulations, however, was a protracted challenge due to higher

mation provision, targeting vulnerable consumers, or inciting other

research and development expenses (Valk, 2015). Subsequently, the

customer-related controversies. Reducing uncertainty through rivalry-

U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) charged two large paint com-

and information-based imitation (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006), can, we

panies PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. and Sherwin-Williams for

argue, unfortunately, encourage harmful behaviors of large, in-group

making deceptive claims that their interior paint products contain

members to be ‘normed’ and propagated across an industry sector.

“zero” volatile organic compounds, VOCs (FTC, 2012).

Building upon Lieberman and Asaba's (2006) theories of imitation, we

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in
any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
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argue that imitation can propagate unethical, harmful behaviors across

In addition, by controlling for several, well-
known firm-and

an industry despite the considerable downside risks of harming con-

industry-level CSiR influences such as advertising intensity, financial

sumers, diminished firm reputation, and damaging lawsuits (e.g., the

risk tolerance, industry growth, capital intensity, and irresponsible

FTC's deceptive claims lawsuit against PPG). As a result, smaller firms,

behaviors within the firm and its peers, we theorize and find sup-

facing a mix of uncertainty and competitive pressures, are incentivized

port for firm size as an important accelerant in propagating harm-

to follow others' harmful behaviors, especially when competing within

ful consumer-related behaviors. Our results suggest firm size plays

the same industry and task environments (Cyert & March, 1963; Gupta

a direct and outsized moderating role that is particularly damaging

et al., 2021).

when peers and smaller firms adopt the harmful consumer practices

Our study initially draws upon rivalry-based theories of imita-

of referent businesses.

tion, defined as conforming to other firms' actions (Fligstein, 1985),

The paper is structured as follows. The next section contrasts the

to examine if prior, irresponsible practices of peers are related to a

positive halo effects of prosocial marketing behavior with a focus on

focal firm's irresponsible behavior toward consumers. Then, using

irresponsible consumer-related behaviors and the mechanisms that

information-
based theories of imitation we examine the role of

underlie prosocial versus irresponsible consumer behaviors. Then,

other, referent firms in encouraging harmful behaviors (Lieberman

based on rivalry-and information-based theories of imitation, we

& Asaba, 2006), potentially infecting entire industries through

develop hypotheses to explain why certain mechanisms (peers' irre-

proliferation, as imitation may be the “sincerest form of flattery”

sponsible behavior and firm size, directly and in combination) might

(Colton, 1824). While imitation is common and can apply to a broad

encourage the diffusion and propagation of harmful consumer-related

category of social or economic practices, legitimate or harmful

practices. In section three, we describe our method and data set of

(Lieberman & Asaba, 2006), we argue that imitation and prolifera-

25,824 firm-year observations across 12 years and methods. Section

tion of firms' unethical practices toward an essential external stake-

four explains the analysis and results including an out-of-time, hold-

holder, consumers are more likely to be affected by peer pressure

out sample among robustness checks and appropriateness of model

and influential others. As such, large referent firms may render

fit. Section five discusses the conclusions and implications for policy

smaller firms particularly susceptible to spreading harmful behaviors

makers, managers, and researchers. In the final section, we discuss

leading to large negative outcomes for society.

the limitations as well as future research opportunities to better un-

Imitation that encourages the widespread proliferation of mis-

derstand and theorize about how imitation and firm size might play an

deeds, as in the case of numerous competitors offering ‘zero’ VOC

outsized role in promoting harmful corporate behaviors. In particular,

paint products, allows firms to pass on negative externalities to

we discuss how mitigating a ‘monkey see, monkey do’ logic that might

numerous consumers as acceptable behavior, an industry ‘norm’.

encourage smaller firms to imitate other firms' irresponsible behav-

This, in turn, can obscure responsibility while undermining indi-

ior, especially larger firms, without accounting for the harmful conse-

vidual and societal welfare (Aqueveque et al., 2018). Using rivalry-

quences has unintended ethical implications for society.

and information-based theories of imitation, we theorize that the
diffusion of irresponsible behaviors is exacerbated by competitive
pressures (acutely felt by peers and smaller firms) and is multiplied
through the effect of large firms' harmful behaviors. As a result,

2 | TH EO RY A N D H Y P OTH E S E S
D E V E LO PM E NT

widespread imitation of harmful behaviors can create a contagion
effect infecting even more consumers. We examine the conditions

Connectedness between a firm and consumers, an important stake-

under which peers' behavior and uncertainty combine such that im-

holder (Edinger-Schons et al., 2020; Vuković et al., 2020), is essential

itation of other firms' harmful behaviors exacerbates the diffusion

for value creation (Crane, 2020; Escadas et al., 2019). Connectedness,

and proliferation of firm(s)’s misdeeds thereby increasing the wide-

which includes consumers' perceptions of firms' motivations for

spread negative effects of harmful behaviors.

CSR, affects consumers' purchasing behaviors (Escadas et al., 2019;

The purpose of this paper is to advance the reorientation of

Vuković et al., 2020) and vice versa. Firms adjust practices to meet

the CSR and CSiR (corporate social responsibility/ irresponsibility)

consumer demands while customers respond to firms' perceived re-

research agenda toward its origins of benefits (or fewer harms)

sponsible and irresponsible behaviors by adjusting intentions or pur-

toward society (Bowen, 1953; Kim, 2021) by focusing on harm-

chasing decisions (Edinger-Schons et al., 2020; Escadas et al., 2019;

ful actions that extend beyond a focal firm, when imitated by

Kang et al., 2016).

others, exacerbate harm to society. In addition, we seek to contribute to the CSiR literature by identifying how competitive contexts among peers in combination with uncertain outcomes can
encourage imitation of unethical, irresponsible behaviors toward

2.1 | Marketing literature and (ir)
responsible behavior

consumers, an essential stakeholder group. We propose that more
stringent policy and managerial measures are warranted to halt

Extant marketing literature suggests, in general, a firm's positive

large firms' harmful behaviors to mitigate or suppress contagion

prosocial product-related behavior may have a positive spillover,

effects early on.

or halo, effect benefiting the firm (e.g., Bhattacharya & Sen, 2004;

26946424, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/beer.12484 by Loyola University Chicago, Wiley Online Library on [10/11/2022]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License

2

3

Chernev & Blair, 2015; Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006, 2009; Sen &

et al., 2021). At the firm level, research on imitation often applies in-

Bhattacharya, 2001). Prior research suggests that listening to cus-

stitutional theory to examine structuration or isomorphic pressures

tomers' needs and positive prosocial behavior toward correcting or

on firm performance (Hillebrand et al., 2011; Orlitzky et al., 2017;

compensating consumers for negative product/service externalities

Wu et al., 2003). Table 1 highlights prior research on the diffusion

can enhance financial performance (Edinger-Schons et al., 2020;

of prosocial behaviors in marketing with a focus on internal, firm-

Kang et al., 2016; Nickerson et al., 2022). For example, Bhattacharya

specific implications such as firm performance. Nikolaeva and

and Sen (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2004; Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001), re-

Bicho (2011), for example, found that propagating widespread ben-

lying on a stakeholder theoretic approach, found that prosocial ini-

efits through positive behavior such as the adoption of a global CSR

tiatives led to positive consumer responses that included increased

reporting initiative improved firm performance if two conditions

purchase intentions and ultimately, higher market value. Nickerson

were met: (a) rivals' adoption as well as (b) the overall prevalence of

et al. (2022) found that genuine CSR activities aimed at reduc-

CSR reporting practices suggesting that others' behavior matters as

ing negative externalities enhanced sales whereas philanthropic

well as the context encouraging such behavior.

CSR activities did not. One clear benefit of responsible, prosocial,

Imitating firm-level behavior that results in negative consequences

consumer-related practices, aggregated across multiple studies, is

also depends upon how a focal firm adopts these practices (Bhatnagar

attracting and retaining consumers can aid in top-line growth (Henisz

et al., 2016; Hillebrand et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2003). If adopting e-

et al., 2019; Orlitzky et al., 2017). Overall, these studies suggest that

marketing practices, for example, are not in sync with the focal firm's

firms have practical, economic incentives to voluntarily engage in

competencies or identity, wholesale imitation due to bandwagon ef-

positive, prosocial, consumer-focused behaviors.

fects1 can negatively affect firm performance. That is, the mere imi-

Socially irresponsible marketing behaviors, on the other hand,
can negate a firm's prosocial behaviors leading to decreased firm
performance and diminished credibility by undermining future

tation of others' marketing behaviors is not a panacea, and does not
guarantee a positive response from consumers or firm-level payoff.
As such, using imitation theory in the context of consumer-

socially responsible activities (Handelman & Arnold, 1999; Kang

related behaviors, we start by theorizing that peers' behaviors and

et al., 2016). Irresponsible behaviors may have more pronounced

competitive context encourage the diffusion of practices. Yet, with

negative effects on the reputation of the brand or firm than the

our focus on the propagation of harmful behaviors, we expect that

firm's responsible behaviors (Escadas et al., 2019) as negative in-

the underlying mechanisms may be different than they would be for

formation is psychologically more influential than positive infor-

imitating prosocial positive behaviors due to the importance of loss

mation due to loss aversion, that is, ‘losses loom larger than gains’

aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 2

(Baumeister et al., 2001; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In short, irre-

Our focus is on the consumer implications of imitating unethi-

sponsible marketing behaviors, such as deceptive tactics or target-

cal practices (i.e., harmful effects on consumers/society rather than

ing vulnerable consumers, can have negative consequences for the

on the firm such as financial performance). As the proliferation of

firm, consumer welfare, and consumers' subsequent behavior (Kang

irresponsible consumer behavior can have strong and negative re-

et al., 2016; Mascarenhas, 1995; Sher, 2011; Smith & Cooper-Martin,

percussions for the firm's brand and reputation, harm consumers,

1997). Taken together, prior research suggests that despite the pres-

and damage their loyalty (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2004), disrupting

ence of responsible behavior a firm can be penalized for socially irre-

consumer loyalty can, in turn, have untold indirect multiplier effects

sponsible consumer-related actions.

with ongoing negative firm outcomes over time (Griffin, 2016). As

Given the potential penalties of irresponsible consumer-related

consumers have additional avenues of recourse such as switching

behaviors, our research question explores the conditions under

brands, posting negative feedback online, or bringing lawsuits, it is in

which irresponsible consumer-related behaviors are diffused and

the firm's best interest to resist the contagion of practices that po-

propagated across firms, through a contagion effect, amounting to

tentially harm consumers, the brand, and/or reputation of the firm.

untold harmful consequences for numerous consumers.

Taken together, we begin with a conservative view that prop-

In the next section, we use rivalry-based imitation theory to

agation of harmful behavior is, ceteris paribus, less likely than the

conceptualize imitation as a low-cost, competitive response that en-

propagation of prosocial behaviors; finding significant, widespread

courages the diffusion of harmful behaviors. Then, using rivalry-and

diffusion of harmful behaviors is unlikely. The next section uses the-

information-based imitation theory we argue that referent firms can

ories of imitation to explain why irresponsible consumer behavior

have an outsized effect on smaller firms that moderates the prolifer-

might exist and persist.

ation of irresponsible behaviors toward consumers.

2.2 | Mechanisms underlying (ir)
responsible behaviors

2.2.1 | Imitation theory and peers' prior
irresponsible behavior
Rivalry-based imitation theory

Prior research on imitation has examined individual-level peer in-

Lieberman and Asaba (2006) suggest that rivalry-based theories

fluences to explain, for example, CEO political decisions (Gupta

of imitation focus on peers as a relevant referent group to create
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TA B L E 1 Imitation and marketing behaviors –Through an institutional theory lens
Article

Research question

Key findings

Bhatnagar et al. (2016)

What are the characteristics of retailers who imitate
practices of other firms?

New firms and smaller retailers imitate due to
efficiency; large retailers imitate due to legitimacy

Khan et al. (2015)

What leads to CSR in the absence of regulation?

Under weak regulation, MNCs have the propensity to
develop normatively acceptable CSR marketing in
response to informal institutional pressures

Hillebrand et al. (2011)

What are the effects of mimetic motives on customer
insights and relationship performance?

Mimetic motives have a negative influence on the
effectiveness of adopted marketing practice,
except when a strategic fit between practice and
firm is present

Martin et al. (2011)

Do firms with authentic ethical identities vs. strategic
identities respond differently to institutional CSR
pressures?

Firms whose identity is tied to authentic vs.
calculated ethical behavior do so strategically
in line with normative ethical expectations and
institutional isomorphism; Exceeding ethical
norms can produce a comparative advantage

Nikolaeva and Bicho (2011)

Does imitation of other firms affect adoption of global
CSR reporting standards?

Adoption is affected by competitors' adoption
and overall diffusion of practice among global
businesses; No evidence that top brand
companies are less likely to imitate

Connelly et al. (2011)

How does institutional theory apply to marketing
strategy?

Institutional theory is one of nine theories from
strategy literature that can explain firm adoption
of sustainable marketing practices

Wu et al. (2003)

What are the antecedents of intensity of e-business
adoption?

Normative pressures adopted due to bandwagon
effects rather than strategic or economic reasons
did not improve organizational performance

Handelman and
Arnold (1999)

How do performative (e.g., economic-oriented actions)
versus institutional actions with a social dimension
affect consumer response?

Socially oriented institutional actions establish
reputational legitimacy and have a direct effect
on firm performance; negative socially-oriented
actions negate the effects of highly efficient firms

competitive parity or decrease rivalry. Rival firms' behavior may

organizations having smaller, less visible, ‘merely incremental’ con-

convey information about widespread, acceptable, legitimate, or

cerns. Displaying incremental yet potentially numerous, unethical

superior practices (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). Further, uncertainty

behaviors (as opposed to profligate disasters such as the 2010 BP

due to turbulent competitive environments, rife with randomness

oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico that remained a headline for more than

(Emery & Trist, 1965), can thus result in imitating others' behaviors

100 days) may create a sense of acceptable competitive behaviors

without necessarily understanding the underlying motivation or

thereby creating disincentives for a firm desiring to differentiate it-

consequential effects (Grewal & Dharwadkar, 2002; Lieberman &

self via responsible behavior (Fooks et al., 2013). Normalizing an in-

Asaba, 2006)—a ‘monkey see, monkey do’ situation. In short, the ac-

dustry's unethical behavior can induce, in turn, a race to the bottom

tions of other referent firms such as in-group organizations may be

(a contagion effect) for all firms within a sector (Bryant et al., 2020;

viewed as conveying information about accepted business practices,

Griffin et al., 2015). The widespread proliferation of unethical mar-

even if those practices are to the detriment of the firm, or stakehold-

keting behaviors in a sector is particularly problematic because norm

ers. In doing so, referent groups may encourage the proliferation of

violations can rapidly spread through a group when one's actions are

unethical or illegal product-related practices. This result is consist-

conditioned on the compliance of another (Diekmann et al., 2015).

ent with findings from Kedia et al. (2015), who found that unethical

Despite loss aversion and reputational pressures limiting the

earnings reporting is likely to be imitated by other, similar firms such

likelihood of consumer-
related irresponsible behaviors, based on

as rivals.

rivalry-based imitation theory, we theorize that uncertainty stem-

Further, considering that many firms within a sector can be

ming from competitive pressures will increase the likelihood of imi-

tarred by the same brush when irresponsible behavior is profligate

tation of peers' harmful behaviors in a focal firm. Overall, we expect

(c.f., the entire fossil fuel industry being scrutinized after oil spills

that in aggregate, the irresponsible marketing practices of rival firms

in Cragg & Greenbaum, 2002; Griffin, 2021; King et al., 2002) or

within the same industry sector will influence a firm's own unethical

when the industry is already controversial (Aqueveque et al., 2018),

marketing behaviors to increase imitation.

bad behavior may have become normalized as part of acceptable

As a baseline, we hypothesize that if rivals have previously en-

competitive behaviors in certain industries. Thus, a spill-over effect

gaged in irresponsible marketing behavior, the focal firm will be

may occur once irresponsible practices are started, even for those

more likely to adopt irresponsible practices.
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Hypothesis 1 There is a positive relationship between rivals' previous

actions of others might confer legitimacy, especially if imitating ref-

irresponsible behavior and the likelihood of a focal firm's irre-

erence groups that act as proxies for trustworthiness (DiMaggio &

sponsible behavior.

Powell, 1983; Lieberman & Asaba, 2006) and connectedness. This in
turn implies the likelihood of a positive outcome of imitation (Crane,
2020) even if actual losses occur. These referent groups may signal

2.2.2 | Firm size effects and mimicking large,
in-group referents

greater prestige, standing, and/or information advantages than others (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). This is akin to choosing a restaurant
because of the long line of customers waiting outside, assuming the

Because larger firms are more visible, their practices are more likely

queue is a signal of quality.

to attract attention from the media, regulators, consumers, commu-

According to information-based theories of imitation (Lieberman

nity groups, and other external stakeholders (Surroca et al., 2010;

& Asaba, 2006), the effect of firm size on the focal firm's irrespon-

Waddock & Graves, 1997). With more scrutiny, more irresponsible

sible behavior, however, will likely depend on the actions of other

behaviors might be brought to light, as a form of, or an attempt to

firms. Smaller firms, for example, are more likely to imitate larger

exert, social control (Campbell, 2007).

firms under the assumption that larger firms have superior infor-

Larger firms may also be directly engaged in more product-

mation (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). When studying chemical firms'

related controversies, with concomitant legal and reputational risks

investment in capacity Gilbert and Lieberman (1987) found smaller

(Orlitzky et al., 2017), even though larger firms may have more, var-

firms followed the lead of larger firms within the industry. One rea-

ied financial and non-financial resources able to be brought to bear

son for this size-based behavior is that “firms adopt the practices

or to offset the costs for regulatory compliance, publicity, and stake-

of ‘legitimate’ organizations and that legitimacy is inferred from

holder management activities (Surroca et al., 2010). Yet, given the

traits like large size and success” a process known as trait-based

costs of implementing prosocial beneficial solutions or offering rep-

imitation (Haunschild & Miner, 1997, p. 475). Gupta et al. (2021, p.

arations for prior harmful behavior (e.g., recalls), larger firms may use

530) further suggest that referent firms, in particular, ‘larger, more

a communications strategy rather than implementing responsible

prestigious, and higher-performing firms’ shape the salience and

behaviors. This may create a gap between saying and doing (Wickert

perceived merits of certain behaviors, thereby ‘affecting the like-

et al., 2016).

lihood that those decisions will be emulated’. Thus, firm size is a

Furthermore, larger firms, presumably having more resources
in the form of profitability (measured through accounting or mar-

specific trait known to lead to imitation with smaller firms more
likely to imitate.

ket returns) and/or tolerance for risk due to diversification, may

In finance, for example, unethical financial behaviors can be dif-

not directly address the complex, interrelated issues and processes

fused especially if the initial unethical actor is an in-group member

needed to staunch wrongdoings (Delmas et al., 2011). Larger firms

(Gino et al., 2009) that is facing uncertainty (Greve et al., 2010).

may instead be content with buffering against volatility and envi-

Greve et al. (2010) discuss how unethical actions such as option

ronmental complexity (Bansal, 2005; Fu et al., 2021; Montgomery

back-dating can spread throughout industries citing imitation of a

& Singh 1984; Peteraf, 1993; Sharfman & Fernando, 2008) enabling

referent group/organization as a primary mechanism. Unethical fi-

the firm to withstand the scrutiny of harmful behaviors over the lon-

nance actions are said to proliferate because decision-makers look

ger term. This occurs despite evidence that merely increasing the

toward similar/proximate others for social proof (i.e., legitimating or

number and variety of financial investments in prosocial activities is

norming behaviors) on what to do in the face of uncertainty (Greve

ineffective in offsetting the negative effects of irresponsible behav-

et al., 2010).

ior (Kang et al., 2016).
In short, we expect to find a direct relationship between firm size

Because proliferation is more likely to occur when firms are
facing uncertainty (Crane, 2020; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and

and irresponsible behavior, after controlling for risk tolerance and

when coupled with information-and rivalry-based imitation theory

profitability. Ceteris paribus, larger firms are more likely to engage

(Lieberman & Asaba, 2006), peer pressure and larger firms engag-

in and be cited for, irresponsible marketing behavior despite the

ing in harmful behaviors may exacerbate the likelihood of imitation.

numerous reputational and performance disincentives for harmful,

Smaller firms may be more prone to mimicking and proliferating

unethical behavior directed toward consumers.

other in-group members' unethical marketing behaviors, despite the
disincentives of harmful behavior on firm performance, the liability

Hypothesis 2 There is a positive relationship between firm size and the
likelihood of a focal firm's irresponsible behavior.

of lawsuits, and consumers' negative reactions. Smaller firms, for
example, with fewer resources facing competitive pressures may
be more likely to cut expenses, delaying all but the most essential

Information-based imitation theory

expenditures, and thus imitate rivals' irresponsible behaviors as an

Information-based theories of imitation, in contrast to rivalry-based

information-based low-cost strategy (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006).

imitation theories, suggest that firms may be more likely to mimic the

Rather than exploring a wider range of alternative behaviors or de-

behavior of a referent group inferred to have superior information

laying action to better understand the positive and negative conse-

about actions or outcomes (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). Imitating the

quences of others' activities, once a practice is widespread a smaller
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firm may choose to mimic rivals to enhance legitimacy (Brammer &

Hypothesis 3 There is an interactional effect of rivals' previous irre-

Millington, 2005; Brown & Forster, 2013; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983;

sponsible behavior with firm size on the likelihood of a focal firm's

Lieberman & Asaba, 2006).

irresponsible behavior.

Firms may also succumb to imitation due to external social pressure (Hildebrand et al., 2011) –which may favor imitation of larger

Overall, under uncertainty, firms may seek certainty by conform-

firms' behavior –especially when social pressures are impinging

ing their behaviors to the practices of relevant others and those con-

upon an entire industry sector (Aqueveque et al., 2018; Mahon &

sidered standard setters as a form of legitimacy-seeking behaviors.

McGowan, 1996). Whereas internal CSR behaviors might be influ-

When uncertainty is combined with competitive pressures, imitation

enced by internal firm-specific factors such as corporate values,

is a viable low-cost strategy when resources are restricted to signal

governance, or mission alignment (Zaman et al., 2022), information-

the adoption of acceptable, desirable practices. Of course, longer-

based imitation theory suggests that others' behaviors are particu-

term consequences of imitation may be unknown or unknowable

larly influential in the focal firm's behavior toward external-facing

especially when market leaders' and rivals' behaviors are presumed

consumers.

to be associated with legitimate, profitable behaviors. As even more

Larger firms may initiate and render behavior legitimate while

firms adopt and thus propagate irresponsible practices, smaller firms

limiting their accountability for the proliferation of harmful mis-

facing uncertainty and rivalry pressures may not want to risk being

deeds once unintended consequences are identified. As such,

identified as the odd one out, even though the consequences of the

smaller firms that imitate larger firms using information-
based

behavior are unknown or known to be unethical. The resulting im-

imitation without a broad understanding of unintended conse-

itation of others' prior unethical behavior can, in turn, rapidly and

quences may unwittingly propagate harmful behaviors through so-

broadly expand, especially among smaller firms, thereby propagat-

ciety. Once adopted, a harmful practice may become widespread

ing negative consequences for consumers, firms, and the industry.

and normalized across a sector with harmful consequences for

Figure 1 shows our hypothesized relationships.

society. If rivals' and especially larger firms' errors of commission
(harmful product practices) encourage numerous other firms to follow suit, then widespread risks might be shared by the industry
(Misani, 2010)—a potential contagion that proliferates unethical,
harmful behaviors.

3

|

M E TH O D S

3.1 | Data

At the same time, prior studies have found that market leaders
and firms with greater visibility are less likely to imitate others (Aerts

We combine data from “perhaps (the) oldest and best-k nown CSR

et al., 2006; Rosenkopf & Abrahamson, 1999). Larger firms with

rating schemes in the US” (Lim & Pope, 2020, p. 456) to exam-

more resources, experience, and capabilities upon which to draw for

ine the irresponsible marketing behavior of firms and rivals, as

strategic direction (Waddock & Graves, 1997), are more likely to be

described below, from the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD)

market leaders, not followers and may be less likely to follow irre-

Socrates/MSCI ESG database. This widely used CSR database

sponsible actions of others.

(Chen, 2021; Hillman & Keim, 2001; Oikonomou et al., 2014;

As a result, we expect larger firms will be more likely to engage in

Surroca et al., 2010; Waddock & Graves, 1997), includes detailed,

harmful behavior (Hypothesis 2) yet be limited in imitating harmful

annual measures of positive and negative firm behaviors, catego-

behaviors. We expect smaller firms, due to uncertainty exacerbated

rized by stakeholder group (e.g., consumers, employees, etc.). In

by rivalry-and information-based imitation, to be more likely to

2003, the KLD was expanded with the addition of MSCI USA IMI

propagate unethical behaviors through the imitation of irresponsible

index firms to the data set (MSCI, 2016) “to measure the perfor-

marketing behaviors. Following this logic, we propose that firm size

mance of the large, mid and small-c ap segments of the US market”

moderates the propagation of irresponsible marketing behavior such

(MSCI, 2017).

that smaller firms are more likely to propagate unethical behavior

These KLD data were matched with annual firm-level finan-

with outsized effects, that is, firm size and imitation effects are con-

cial information from the Compustat North American database

tingent on each other. In other words, the effects of peers' irrespon-

(http://www.compus tat.com/), including balance sheet details

sible behavior on the likelihood of a firm's irresponsible behavior will

and profitability measures. We use data collected from 2004 to

be larger for smaller firms. More specifically:

2015, with 2003 data used to provide lagged variables and 2016

F I G U R E 1 Proposed model of
likelihood of Firm's irresponsible
marketing behavior
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data used as a hold-o ut test of the model's accuracy and predictive

North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) category

ability. Our data, bounded on the low end by KLD's 2003 change in

as a measure of firms competing in similar industries. Peers' ir-

population to include more firms across the large, mid-and small-

responsible marketing behavior was calculated as the percent of

cap segments, is bounded on the high end by our 2016 holdout

firms with product controversies at the two-digit NAICS level, ex-

sample resulting in our final sample including 25,824 firm-year

cluding the focal firm. Firm size was measured as the natural log of

observations.

net sales reported in millions of dollars (Chen, 2021) of the focal
firm. Both independent variables (peers' irresponsible behavior

3.2 | Dependent variable

and firm size) were lagged by one year to guard against reverse
causality which allows our model to capture the appropriate temporal ordering of a focal firm's reactions to the actions of others

Consistent with CSR research, we measured each firm's irresponsi-

(Orlitzky et al., 2017).

ble behavior in terms of product controversies reported in the KLD
data set, previously known as product concerns (Flammer, 2015;
Flammer & Kacperczyk, 2015; Sharfman, 1996). The specific irre-

3.4 | Control variables

sponsible behaviors (see Appendix A) include but are not limited to
“controversial media content, product recalls, deceptive marketing

The irresponsible behaviors of peer firms are just one of a few

or advertising, … predatory pricing, … [and] excessive or hidden fees”

sector-level effects that may influence a firm's behavior. Firms

MSCI ESG Research (2016, pp. 37–39).

in capital-
intensive sectors, having specialized property, plant,

Few firms in KLD have more than one product-related irre-

and equipment with significant sunk costs may be more likely

sponsible controversy within a year. Specifically, over the 12-year

to cut corners (Hatfield et al., 1996) and respond to competitive

data period, approximately 10.4% of firm observations have one

pressures by utilizing a low-cost mechanism, namely, imitation.

product controversy in a year and approximately 85.9% of firm-

Addressing preexisting negative practices requires systematic,

year observations had no product controversy in a year. As a re-

significant investments of unrecoverable costs incurred over

sult, more than 96% of the data are instances where firm-year

time (Delmas et al., 2011; Russo & Fouts, 1997). Thus, in capital-

observations have either one or no irresponsible marketing be-

intensive sectors, irresponsible marketing behaviors may persist

haviors. As such, the data were collapsed to a binary distribution

due to the expensive, long, and uncertain payoff horizons for cor-

and modeled using the logit link function to predict the likelihood

recting these behaviors. The control variable sector-level capital

a firm has product controversy (1: “yes”) versus no product con-

intensity was measured as the weighted average “dollar value of

cerns (0: “no”).

plant, property, and equipment per employee,” following previous

We chose this approach to measuring product-related irre-

research (Griffin et al., 2015; Miles et al., 1993, p. 169) and then

sponsible controversies, i.e., yes/no versus counting the total

aggregated at the two-digit NAICS sector level and scaled by a

number of controversies, because of the relatively long period

factor of 1000 to simplify reporting estimates.

of study and changes in KLD data collection (Eccles et al., 2020).

To control for additional sector-
level social pressures, we

Within each year the count of controversies would be internally

included a measure of peers' responsible behavior as positive so-

consistent; however, across time, changes in measurement prac-

cially responsible behaviors may co-exist with harmful behaviors

tices pose more of a threat to the stability of a sensitive measure

(Mattingly & Berman, 2006). Pressures of conformity leading to

such as counts as opposed to a binary, yes/no measure. In essence,

diffusion of practices can induce replication of behaviors (Griffin

we argue that KLD measurements are likely more dependable in

et al., 2015) via a complex decision-making process that becomes

identifying a firm with some controversial action as opposed to

mutually reinforcing (Hillenbrand et al., 2012) after a critical

accurately specifying the number of controversial actions of firms.

mass of firms make credible commitments (Griffin et al., 2015).

As such, a yes/no proxy measure will more consistently reflect the

This prosocial diffusion variable gives our model the ability to

underlying construct with less fluctuation due to spurious exog-

account for firm actions by peers within the same sector by ex-

enous factors across long periods when compared with specific

amining product strengths, taken from the KLD data set (Griffin

counts of irresponsible behavior.

et al., 2015). Product strengths occur when a firm's products have
been recognized for quality, innovation, benefits to economically

3.3 | Independent variables

disadvantaged consumers, or other noteworthy social benefits
(MSCI, 2016). The measure is constructed in the same manner as
peers' irresponsible behavior.

To examine the propagation of irresponsible marketing behavior,

Following Staw and Szwajkowski (1975), we control for sec-

we measure the percentage of peer firms engaging in irresponsi-

tor growth, because firms operating in an environment of scarce

ble marketing behavior, that is, peers' irresponsible behavior. To de-

resources, that is, when facing low or no growth, are more likely

velop this measure, we define peers as rival firms within a similar

to commit illegal acts (from Dess & Beard, 1984, p. 55). A lack

sector (Kilduff et al., 2010; Schuler et al., 2002) using the two-digit

of industry-
level growth might induce firm-or product-
related
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cost-cutting for organizations seek, but do not always find, environ-

Flammer, 2015; Godfrey, 2005; Griffin & Mahon, 1997; Shiu &

ments that sustain growth (Dess & Beard, 1984). We measure sector

Yang, 2017). Actions that strengthen product quality and con-

growth at the two-digit NAICS level, as the sector's average three-

sumer relations today may increase stakeholders' willingness

year percent change in sales, similar to previous research (Griffin

to tolerate negative actions from the past, or create a halo on

et al., 2015).

future, negative actions (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2004; Chernev

We also control for several firm-
level variables. A firm's

& Blair, 2015; Godfrey et al., 2009; Kang et al., 2016; Luo &

innovativeness, measured by R&D expense, has been linked

Bhattacharya, 2006, 2009; Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001). As such,

to positive CSR behavior (Barnett & Salomon, 2012; Luo &

firms may engage in positive product-r elated actions to counter-

Bhattacharya, 2006, 2009; Luo & Du, 2015; McWilliams &

act negative externalities, increased scrutiny, or product-r elated

Siegel, 2001). We also include firm-level advertising expense, which

controversies. Consistent with prior research (Bryant et al., 2020)

is related to the consumer perceptions of a firm and can influence

we control for a firm responsible behavior by including a dummy

CSR and its effectiveness (Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006, 2009; Sen

variable indicating if the firm has product strengths as measured

& Bhattacharya, 2001; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013). To simplify re-

by KLD (MSCI, 2016). As prior firm irresponsible behavior may

porting parameter estimates, these values were scaled by a factor

lead to current irresponsible behaviors, we lagged the dependent

of 1000. Risk tolerance controls for highly leveraged firms that may

variable by one year to account for each firm's past proclivity for

approach decisions differently than firms with less debt and lower

irresponsible behaviors.

financial risk (Bryant et al., 2020). We use the long-term debt to

Dummy variables for each year are included in the KLD model

total assets ratio as a measure of a firm's financial risk tolerance

as recommended by Eccles et al. (2020) to account for fixed effects

(Waddock & Graves, 1997).

of time due to the changes that have occurred in the KLD data

To increase profitability, firms may increase harmful product-

collection process over our 12-year period. Similarly, we include

related behaviors. Or under conditions of scarcity (low profitabil-

a dummy variable for each sector. By including these fixed effects

ity), firms may increase irresponsible behaviors by not investing

for both time and market sectors we are accounting for additional

in mitigating harmful hazards as short-term cost-cutting tactics.

sources of potential omitted variable bias across these dimensions.

Low profitability may further exacerbate irresponsible harmful

All control variables, except for the year and the time-invariant

practices (Ansari et al., 2010; Becchetti et al., 2015; Cordeiro

sector fixed effects, are lagged by 1 year. By lagging the control

& Sarkis, 1997; Kang et al., 2016; Navarro, 1988; Westphal

variables, we match the one-year lag of the independent variables

et al., 1997). In short, firms with higher profitability should be less

of interest.

likely to engage in risky, irresponsible behavior while firms with
lower profitability should be more likely to engage in risky, irresponsible behavior. We control for profitability using three indicators to reflect accounting and market-b ased profitability: return on

4 | A N A LYS I S , R E S U LT S , RO B U S TN E S S
TE S TI N G , A N D M O D E L FIT

assets, diluted earnings per share excluding extraordinary income,
We begin by comparing the rate of firms having irresponsible behav-

and dividends per share.
Another reason firms may engage in positive, socially re-

iors across each independent variable: peer irresponsible behavior

sponsible activities is to deceive, respond to, mask, or serve

and firm size. High and low levels were created through a median

as an insurance policy against bad deeds (Bryant et al., 2020;

split and charted in Figure 2 for each independent variable. Large

30%

Firms with Irresponsible Behavior

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

Rivals' Irresponsible Behavior

Median Split (Lagged):

Firm Size

Low

High

F I G U R E 2 Percentage of firms with
irresponsible behavior. Independent
variables (x-axis) lagged by 1 year. Error
bars represent the 95% confidence
interval around the proportion of firms
with irresponsible behaviors calculated
using the normal approximation method.
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differences exist in the rate of irresponsible behaviors correspond-

9

the entire set of control variables, our findings from the full model

ing with peer irresponsible behaviors and firm size, findings consist-

(Model 3, Table 2) are consistent with the more parsimonious

ent with Hypotheses 1 and 2.

analysis (Model 1, Table 2). Because Model 3 with control vari-

We test our hypotheses through a series of logistic regression

ables has a superior fit compared with Model 1 (ΔAIC = 6705),

models specified to test the robustness of our findings against alter-

we will report statistics from this model when formally testing

2

nate model specifications. Our full model has a rescaled R value of

our hypotheses.

0.70 indicating a good fit. Because other measures of model fit are

Hypothesis 1 predicted a positive relationship between peers'

relative and/or depend on applying the model to a holdout sample,

irresponsible marketing behavior and the focal firm's irresponsible

they will be discussed after the model-building process results are

consumer-related practices. When all control variables are added, in

presented. We will designate results that are consistent across all al-

Model 3, this hypothesis is not supported. The main effect associated

ternate model specifications as robust while inconsistent significant

with peers' irresponsible behavior is positive (βPeerIrresponsibleBehavior =

effects will be described as fragile.

2.67, p = .13), yet not significant. Thus, the main effect of peers' irresponsible behavior has fragile support, as a significant relationship

4.1 | Results

was only found under a simplified model without control variables
(Model 1).
We find support for Hypothesis 2, which predicted a positive

To test our hypotheses, we begin by estimating a model using only

relationship between firm size and a firm's irresponsible market-

the independent variables associated with main effects, excluding

ing behavior. The main effect associated with firm size in Model 3

an interaction term, and controlling for fixed effects by year and

is positive and significant (βFirmSize = .55, p < .01). This result is con-

sector. This model shows a statistically significant (α = .05) rela-

sistent even when the interaction term is removed from the model

tionship for peers' irresponsible behavior (βPeerIrresponsibleBehavior = .91,

(βFirmSize = .48, p < .01). Thus, we can conclude that larger firms are

p = .02) and firm size (βFirmSize = .86, p < .01) in predicting the odds of

consistently more likely than smaller firms to have irresponsible

a focal firm's irresponsible actions. These results are consistent with

practices.

Hypotheses 1 and 2.

We also find support for Hypothesis 3, which suggested that the

Hypothesis 3 proposes an interaction effect such that the ef-

effect size of peers' irresponsible marketing behavior on the firm's ir-

fect of peers' irresponsible actions and firm size are contingent on

responsible marketing behavior decreases as firm size increases. The

each other. To examine the contingent nature of this relationship,

significant interaction (βPeer*Size = −.45, p = .04) term in Model 3 in-

we add an interaction term to the basic main effects model. The

dicates that the effect of peers' irresponsible behavior and firm size

results (Model 1, Table 2) show a statistically significant (α = .05)

on a firm's irresponsible behavior needs to be analyzed together to

relationship for peers' irresponsible behavior (βPeerIrresponsibleBehavior

provide a complete understanding. The significant interaction term

= 4.11, p < .01) and firm size (βFirmSize = .93, p < .01) in predicting the

is robust and consistent in both Model 1 and 3 indicating a positive

odds of a focal firm's irresponsible actions while the interaction

interaction between peers' irresponsible behavior and for firms of a

between these two effects is also significant and negative (βPeer *-

certain size, the focal firm's irresponsible practices.

= −.41, p < .01). Further, the addition of the interaction term im-

Finally, examining our control variables in Model 3, capital in-

proves the overall model fit by decreasing the Akaike Information

tensity (p < .05), advertising expenses (p < .05), risk tolerance (p < .01),

Size

Criterion (ΔAIC = 4), where a smaller number indicates a better fit.

and firms' prior irresponsible behavior (p < .01) all consistently cor-

The results from Model 1 indicate the effects of peer irresponsible

relate with a firm's subsequent harmful behaviors. A possible ex-

actions and firm size jointly depend on each other. Further, the

planation for these findings is that higher levels of capital intensity

significance of the interaction between firm size with peers' prior

and risk tolerance (i.e., debt ratios) could lead to more uncertainty

irresponsible behavior remains even after adding control variables

and an increased incentive to engage in higher-risk imitative prac-

(Model 3).

tices. Advertising expenses could be interpreted as a measure of in-

The second model (Model 2, Table 2) is used as a baseline for

dustry competitiveness and dependency on consumers' short-term

comparison. It shows the results of a logistic regression model

purchasing preferences, which also provides an incentive to imi-

using only the control variables but none of the key independent

tate behaviors without considering longer-term consequences. In

variables of interest. The full model of control variables with all

addition, firms' prior irresponsible behavior may account for the fact

independent variables (Model 3, Table 2) shows an improved

that irresponsible practices, once adopted, may become a contin-

model fit over the baseline model (ΔAIC = 458). Because of the

uous aspect of a firm's market participation, especially when other

improved fit of Model 3, we conclude that the independent vari-

firms engage in similar behaviors, a form of ‘normalized behaviors’.

ables improve the model's explanatory power in addition to the

Overall we find that peers' irresponsible behavior needs to be

control variables used in Model 2. As with Model 1, Model 3 also

considered in conjunction with firm size to understand the potential

shows a significant interaction (α = .05) with all parameter esti-

effects of accelerating harmful behaviors through an interaction ef-

mates consistent in sign with Model 1. Thus, even after adding

fect. The next section interrogates the interaction effect.
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TA B L E 2 Logistic regression models
Total observations
(n) = 25,824

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Firm-year “yes” pct. = 14.1%

Basic model

Control variables only

Full model

Parameters

Estimate

SE

p -value

Estimate

SE

p -value

Estimate

SE

p -value

Intercept

−10.288

0.487

<.0001

−4.113

0.623

<.0001

−8.187

0.802

<.0001

Peer irresponsible behavior

4.105

1.325

.0019

2.667

1.777

.1334

Firm size: ln(sales)

0.927

0.030

<.0001

0.546

0.042

<.0001

Firm size × Peer irresponsible
behavior

−0.408

0.162

.0118

−0.448

0.221

.0428

Capital intensity

−0.772

0.370

.0368

−0.856

0.378

.0234

Peer responsible behavior

1.236

0.611

.0431

1.026

0.629

.1030

Sector growth

−0.085

0.050

.0935

−0.081

0.049

.0965

R&D expense

0.382

0.065

<.0001

0.098

0.056

.0809

Advertising expense

0.551

0.090

<.0001

0.162

0.080

.0434

Risk tolerance

0.854

0.135

<.0001

0.671

0.143

<.0001

Profit: Return on assets

0.888

0.264

.0008

0.258

0.322

.4220

Profit: Earnings per share

0.007

0.004

.1219

−0.006

0.008

.4350

Profit: Dividends per share

0.032

0.015

.0404

−0.031

0.031

.3100

Firm responsible behavior

0.440

0.105

<.0001

0.141

0.106

.1843

4.911

0.066

<.0001

4.487

0.068

<.0001

Firm irresponsible behavior
Year fixed effects
(2004–2015)

Included

Included

Included

Sector fixed effects

Included

Included

Included

−2 Log L (smaller is better)

15,126

8864

8399

AIC development data

15,200

8954

8495

AUC development data

0.853

0.932

0.950

Max-rescaled R 2

0.368

0.675

0.695

AUC holdout data (2016)

0.858

0.920

0.940

Accuracy (%) holdout data
(2016)

92.7%

94.3%

94.4%

Model fit statistics

Note: All variables listed with enumerated parameter estimates were lagged by 1 year.

4.1.1 | Examining the interaction effect of peers'
irresponsible behavior and firm size

firms having peers with increasingly more irresponsible behavior are
more likely to follow suit. For larger firms, however, the relationship
moves in the opposite direction suggesting imitation affects smaller

To portray the interaction effect of peer irresponsible behavior

firms. Overall, the countervailing effects of peers' irresponsible be-

and firm size, Figure 3 charts the effect of peers' irresponsible be-

havior on small firms versus large firms support our hypothesis that

havior at different firm sizes, ceteris paribus. Figure 3 shows that

the propagation of unethical marketing behavior is more likely to

larger firms (95th percentile) have a greater modeled probability of

occur in smaller firms. Figure 3 and Model 3, together, depict the

engaging in irresponsible behavior than small firms (5th percentile)

direct effects of firm size supporting Hypothesis 2 as well as the

if no peers have irresponsible behavior, shown at the y-a xis inter-

inverse, interaction effects of firm size and peers' irresponsible be-

cept. For a larger firm (95th percentile) the association is negative,

havior supporting Hypothesis 3.

decreasing as the percentage of peer firms with irresponsible behavior increases. For a smaller firm (5th percentile), the likelihood/
effect of irresponsible behavior increases as peers' irresponsible

4.2 | Model appropriateness

behavior increases.
The positive slope suggests smaller firms are more susceptible to

Because KLD changed its methodology in 2011 (Eccles et al., 2020),

imitation effects due to their peers' irresponsible practices. Smaller

we first check our model's appropriateness by splitting our data into
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F I G U R E 3 Firm size and peer
irresponsible behavior effects on the
probability of focal firm's irresponsible
behavior. To chart the interactions,
modeled probabilities are shown for
different sizes of firms: Small (5th
percentile) and large (95th percentile). The
shaded area around the lines indicates
95% confidence intervals. All other
variables are held constant, i.e., all effects
shown are for the construction sector
(NAICS = 22) in 2009 at average values
for control variables.

two subsets: 2004–2010 and 2011–2015. Re-running Model 3 for

on the y-axis versus 1-specificity, that is, the false positivity rate, on

each subset, we find consistent results. The main effect of peers'

the x-axis of the chart. The model fit is measured by the area under

irresponsible behavior is positive but not significant (2004–2010

the curve (AUC). An AUC value of 1.00 corresponds with perfect

sample: βPeerIrresponsibleBehavior = 4.20, p = .10; 2011–2015 sample:

prediction whereas an AUC = 0.50 is represented by a diagonal line

βPeerIrresponsibleBehavior = 4.31, p = .18). The main effect of firm size is

in the ROC chart that has no predictive power. Figure 4 shows the

positive and significant (2004–2010 sample: βFirmSize = .68 p < .01;

ROC chart for our initial data sample used for model development

2011–2015 sample: βFirmSize = .54, p < .01) and the interaction is neg-

(AUCModel3 = 0.95) and our 2016 out-of-time holdout sample for

ative and significant (2004–2010 sample: βPeer*Size = −.77, p = .02;

model validation (AUCModel3 = 0.94). Given these high AUC values,

2011–2015 sample: βPeer*Size = −1.15, p < .01).

our model appears to be appropriate, accurate, and capable of dis-

To further test the model's appropriateness, we examined the

tinguishing firms with irresponsible marketing behavior in our out-

predictive strength of our full model (Model 3, Table 2) against an

of-time holdout sample. Finally, visually we can compare the ROC

out-of-time holdout sample from 2016 (n = 2073) for model vali-

charts which show similar patterns in development and validation

dation. As our development model (Model 3, Table 2) accounts for

charts. These data checks show relatively consistent results, indicat-

temporal differences with fixed effects, we treat the observations

ing model appropriateness without suffering from issues of overfit-

as if they occurred in 2015, the most recent year. We find 94.4%

ting to the initial data set.

accuracy in predicting firms' 2016 irresponsible marketing behavior
based on the predicted probability for each observation. For example, if an irresponsible marketing behavior is predicted to be more

4.3 | Robustness of results

likely than not (p[irresponsible marketing behavior = ‘yes'] > .5), then
we classify the observation as if a “yes” is predicted, indicating an

To check that our results are robust to alternate estimations, we

irresponsible behavior is expected. Otherwise, we classify the ob-

employ Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE). This approach, also

servation as if a “no” is predicted. Using this classification system, we

known as a population average model, is well suited to longitudinal/

use the ratio of correctly classified observations to all observations

clustered data analysis (Hubbard et al., 2010; Zeger & Liang, 1986)

as the measure of accuracy (Table 2).

which allows us to account for correlations within firms over time.

Overall accuracy is only one measure of appropriate model fit.

GEE coefficients are interpreted as the effect of one unit of change

Simply predicting no firm will ever have an irresponsible marketing

on the population average, rather than the effect on an individual

behavior, we could predict our development data set with 85.9% ac-

firm like with a generalized linear model (GLM). With GEE we con-

curacy as only 14.1% of firm-year observations have such actions.

duct an analysis similar to the one used in Model 3. The dependent

This high accuracy rate examined in isolation could be misleading

variable of irresponsible behavior is treated as binary (yes/no) using

as it has no sensitivity, that is, the ability to identify firms with irre-

a logit link function and allowing firm observations to be correlated

sponsible marketing behavior. As a result, we use an additional mea-

using an autoregressive structure. All covariates in this analysis are

sure of model fit, a Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) chart.

identical to those in Model 3. Table 3, GEE 1 column shows the re-

A ROC chart plots model sensitivity, that is, the true positivity rate,

sults consistent with Model 3. The main effect of peers' irresponsible
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F I G U R E 4 Model shows 94% accuracy using out-of-time hold out sample, 2016

behavior is positive but not significant (βPeerIrresponsibleBehavior = 2.6

conclusions; smaller firms (vs. larger firms) appear more likely to

3, p = .11), the main effect of firm size is positive and significant

respond to an increase in peers' irresponsible behavior with their

(βFirmSize = .54, p < .01), and the interaction is negative and significant

own irresponsible behavior.

(βPeer*Size = −.44, p = .04).

Finally, examining the control variables with significant relation-

To further analyze the robustness of our findings we alter the

ships in the main analysis, we find that risk tolerance (p < .01) and

measurement of firm irresponsible behaviors. That is, the choice

prior firm irresponsible behavior (p < .01) are significant and consistent

to collapse firm-level irresponsible behavior to a binary yes/no

in direction, which indicates a robust relationship. Capital intensity

indicator was previously discussed, but these data could also be

and advertising expense are not consistently significant in both GEE

conceptualized as count data instead of binary. Count data bring

analyses, potentially indicating a fragile relationship with firms' ir-

a dimension of magnitude into play, that is, multiple irresponsi-

responsible behaviors. To further explore if these control variables

ble behaviors are recognized. To examine how peers' irresponsi-

also depend on the actions of peer firms, a post hoc analysis was

ble behavior and firm size are related to this count measure, we

conducted (Appendix B) where firm size was replaced in the inter-

employ a GEE analysis similar to the one previously described. In

action with peers' irresponsible behavior. No significant interaction

this case, we alter the dependent variable to be the count of firm

was found in this post hoc analysis.

irresponsible behavior for each year. To account for this change,
we use a natural logarithm link function with a negative binomial
distribution, a non-n egative discrete distribution commonly used

5
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to model count data. Otherwise, no other changes were made to
the previous analysis, i.e., the same correlation structure and co-

Clarity regarding the extent to which firms imitate others' unethical,

variates are used. The results of this analysis again portray consis-

harmful behavior is a first step in bringing awareness to the harm

tent conclusions and can be seen in Table 3 (GEE 2 column) with

and proliferation of unethical behaviors in society, across multiple

one exception. In this case, the main effect of peers' irresponsible

firms. Based on theories of imitation, the present study adds to the

behavior is positive and significant (βPeerIrresponsibleBehavior = 1.79,

sparse literature around irresponsible marketing behavior by identi-

p = .03), the main effect of firm size is positive and significant

fying conditions under which larger firms are more likely to commit,

(βFirmSize = .31, p < .01), and the interaction is negative and signif-

while smaller firms are more likely to proliferate, unethical market-

icant (βPeer *Size = −.24, p = .01). These robustness checks indicate

ing behaviors. We argue that imitating the behaviors of other firms

that using both a different analytic technique and different mea-

reduces uncertainty, especially for smaller firms competing within

surement techniques of irresponsible behavior result in similar

the same industry (Gupta et al., 2021; Cyert & March, 1963), despite
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TA B L E 3 Generalized estimating equations: Binary and count irresponsible behavior measurements
Total observations (n) = 25,824

GEE 1 –Binary

GEE 2 –Count

Firm-year “yes” pct. = 14.1%

Dependent variable: Irresponsible behavior
yes (vs no)

Dependent variable: Irresponsible
behavior (0, 1, 2, 3, or 4)

Parameters

Estimate

SE

p -value

Estimate

SE

p -value

Intercept

−8.129

0.606

<.0001

−5.262

0.328

<.0001

Peer irresponsible behavior

2.627

1.648

.1108

1.792

0.812

.0274

Firm size: ln(sales)

0.540

0.041

<.0001

0.312

0.022

<.0001

Firm size × Peer irresponsible
behavior

−0.440

0.209

.0355

−0.244

0.095

.0105

Capital intensity

−0.855

0.417

.0403

−0.290

0.167

.0824

Peer responsible behavior

0.999

0.714

.1615

0.826

0.346

.0171

Sector growth

−0.084

0.047

.0724

−0.009

0.020

.6666

R&D expense

0.095

0.059

.1073

0.028

0.013

.0276

Advertising expense

0.161

0.098

.1015

0.027

0.023

.2436

Risk tolerance

0.668

0.153

<.0001

0.426

0.083

<.0001

Profit: Return on assets

0.263

0.300

.3819

0.329

0.145

.023

Profit: Earnings per share

−0.006

0.007

.3802

−0.003

0.003

.2974

Profit: Dividends per share

−0.031

0.029

.2954

−0.003

0.013

.7932

Firm responsible behavior

0.136

0.103

.1849

0.049

0.041

.2315

0.076

<.0001

2.665

0.060

<.0001

Firm irresponsible behavior

4.541

Year fixed effects (2004–2015)

Included

Included

Sector fixed effects

Included

Included

GEE details
Correlation structure

Autoregressive (1)

Autoregressive (1)

Distribution

Binary

Negative binomial

Link

Logistic

Log

Note: All variables listed with enumerated parameter estimates were lagged by 1 year. Standard errors (SE) and p-values are based on empirical
standard error estimates.

reputational and legal risks stemming from harmful consumer-

sector (Aqueveque et al., 2018; Griffin, 2021; Healy & Griffin, 2004;

related behavior.

Mahon & McGowan, 1996; Prakash & Griffin, 2012) as the harmful

We extend prior work on imitation theory and the proliferation

behaviors become ‘normalized’ or taken-for-granted and adopted

of harmful consumer behaviors which finds that firms imitate suc-

by others. This potential proliferation of unethical product-related

cessful, in-group referents (Bhatnagar et al., 2016; Crane, 2020;

practices (e.g., product safety issues, deceptive marketing practices)

Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011), by offering a model that examines the out-

that might have started with larger firms but can be widely shared

sized role of firm size in the likelihood of proliferating irresponsible

through smaller firms, should be of great interest to business ethics

consumer behaviors.

scholars, marketers, public policymakers, and regulators because the

We found support for our contention that rivalry-and

irresponsible behavior of a few firms may be contagious, expand-

information-based imitation disproportionately influence the like-

ing the negative consequences for society. Smaller firms may un-

lihood of smaller firms' irresponsible marketing behaviors, once

wittingly be expanding irresponsible behaviors more readily if peers

initiated. Our findings suggest that once harmful behavior occurs,

have already adopted irresponsible practices.

conditional upon smaller size, firms are more likely to engage in ir-

From a scholarly perspective, these results confirm previous

responsible marketing behaviors when peers competing in the same

studies that found that it may be risky for firms to unwittingly adopt

sector engage in harmful practices in the prior year.

imitation-
based, me-
too, consumer strategies (Hildebrand et al.,

From a regulatory perspective, these findings further under-

2011; Mena & Chabowski, 2015). In addition, we interrogate the out-

score that harmful behavior from a subset of firms within an in-

sized influence of larger firms in pre-conditioning harmful behaviors

dustry sector (e.g., VW among EU carmakers; BP's Deepwater

as an acceptable business practice and the concomitant prolifera-

Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico; or, Philip Morris and RJR

tion. More research is warranted on the role of larger firms' behavior,

in the global tobacco industry) can potentially cascade through a

in combination with peers' behaviors, that might act as legitimating,
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information-based referents of, acceptable business behavior. We

drinks, or petrochemical sectors (Aqueveque et al., 2018; Derry

also re-focus on the societal implications of CSiR with our focus on

& Waikar, 2008). Alternatively, the mechanisms underlying the

irresponsible behaviors having untold consequences for numerous

proliferation of irresponsible behaviors may be due to competitive

consumers through proliferation.

pressures (e.g., race to the bottom) or industry norms. It may also

From a managerial perspective, we found that certain conditions

be the case that imitation theory is less relevant to harmful be-

may encourage the diffusion of harmful behaviors that other firms

haviors toward other essential stakeholders, such as employees.

seem compelled to follow (Aqueveque et al., 2018). Managers within

Further, this research could be extended by examining the traits

firms that rely upon advertising likely have a larger financial risk tol-

of firms that are being copied, as our research only examined the

erance, and prior irresponsible behaviors are more likely to lead to

imitating firm's characteristics.

subsequent irresponsible behaviors, increasing regulatory, investor

This research relies upon secondary data, which data are con-

relations, and reputational risk. Taken together, a dependency on

sistent with previous research, to examine prosocial and harmful

advertising may signal a firm's communications-focused CSR strat-

business behaviors. While we include temporal lags and attempt to

egy (talking the talk) and when combined alongside a firm's risk-

statistically isolate the effects of peer irresponsible behavior with

willingness (through high financial risk and previous irresponsible

the use of multiple control variables and fixed effects by sector,

consumer behavior), could lend itself to continued risk-willingness for

these results are still correlational. Stronger causal evidence could

future irresponsible marketing practices. More research is needed to

come from randomized experiments or other primary data. Future

understand if punitive penalties, changes in consumer sentiments, or

research using primary data is needed to uncover the underlying

media exposure might change firm behavior for the better or worse.

mechanisms that propagate irresponsible behavior.3

Finally, contrary to expectations, we found that firms in lower

As the decision-making processes underlying these decisions are

capital-intensive sectors are more likely to have irresponsible mar-

likely complex and nuanced, fully understanding and predicting a

keting behaviors. This result may be due to different regulatory

firm's irresponsible behavior require additional examination. Future

environments, more managerial discretion, or consumer depen-

research should examine the relationship between product concerns

dency leading to CSR cynicism within low capital-intensive firms

and current or future product strengths. Further research into the

(Kim, 2021). Alternatively, this could be due to the relatively more

specific unethical, or illegal product practices that are more likely to

pro-social, regulated, long-time horizon nature of firms in capital-

lead to imitation by other firms is also warranted.

intensive sectors (Chapple et al., 2001).

Overall, we found irresponsible consumer-
related practices
in approximately 14 percent of the firm-
year observations in

6
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our sample, with these infractions more common among larger
firms. To the extent that larger firms have higher market share,
more power in the marketplace, and can influence the behaviors

Using rivalry-and information-based theories of imitation, we have

of other smaller firms, especially in concentrated industries, this

argued that firm size directly affects diffusion and moderates the

finding has important implications for regulatory policy and schol-

proliferation of irresponsible marketing behavior such that smaller

arly research.

firms facing uncertainty are more likely to propagate unethical be-

From a regulatory policy perspective, this research suggests that

havior of larger firms. We build on prior work in rivalry-based and

it is important to monitor the actions of larger, market-leading firms

information-based imitation theory by suggesting that the size of

carefully because these firms may be the exemplar for others within

referent firms (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006), moderates the likelihood

the sector. However, when predominantly focusing on larger firms,

of propagating irresponsible behavior toward consumers. Overall,

regulators and the media may fail to notice the actions of the many,

our results suggest larger firms are more likely to have irresponsible

smaller firms which are more susceptible to imitating others' contro-

behavior. But smaller firms are more likely to adopt the practices of

versial practices potentially leading to the proliferation of harmful

others potentially due to the assumption that other firms have supe-

behavior as a contagion effect. Cumulatively, the many, smaller firms

rior information on how to effectively compete under uncertainty

might collectively have more harmful effects from their controver-

(Lieberman & Asaba, 2006).

sial product-related practices and thus a focus on less visible, yet

As this is an initial study, there are several limitations requiring future research examining why and under what conditions im-

contagious harmful behaviors may create a ‘greater bang for the
marginal, policy buck’.

itation and contagions occur, propagating irresponsible business
behaviors broadly across sectors. Further research is needed to
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E N D N OT E S
1

Bandwagon effects are a cognitive bias by which public opinion has
the tendency to alter consumers' adoption of certain behaviors, styles,
or attitudes because others are doing so (Bhatnagar et al., 2016;
Hillebrand et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2003).

2

Although examining the mechanisms underlying socially responsible
practices (e.g., community education and outreach campaigns, philanthropic endeavors, etc.) is beyond the focus of this paper, we control
for prosocial behaviors in our model. Our statistically significant results after controlling for prosocial behaviors suggests that irresponsible practices and the imitation thereof result from distinctly different
influences than would be the case for socially responsible practices.

3

Thanks to a reviewer for highlighting the limitations of secondary data
and the potential value of primary data.
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A P P E N D I X A : KLD PRODUCT CONCERNS*
NEGATIVE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
PRODUCT QUALITY & SAFETY (PRO-CON-A)
This indicator measures the severity of controversies related
to the quality and/or safety of a firm's products and services.
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Topics covered include, for example, food safety, controversial

A P P E N D I X B : ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR

media content, product recalls, service disruptions, and the use

ACCELERATING HARMFUL BEHAVIORS

of chemicals of concern in company products. This indicator also
includes companies with major business involvement in gambling
and tobacco.

Mimicking larger firms as in-group referents within an industry
rife with competitive uncertainty, as we have argued that rivalry-and

MARKETING & ADVERTISING (PRO-CON-D)

information-based imitation theory are not the only reasoning be-

This indicator measures the severity of controversies related

hind why firms may imitate others. For example, similarity in national

to a firm's marketing and advertising practices. Topics covered

business systems or corporate governance structures might create

include, for example, false or deceptive marketing or advertising,

the conditions for conformity of CSR conduct (Zaman et al., 2022).

marketing of products for off-label uses, controversies regarding

Alternatively, firms may benchmark marketing and R&D investments

the marketing of products to children or other vulnerable popula-

to gather signals from the broader market (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006)

tions, labeling controversies, and spam or ad-ware. Controversies

or macro-
economic conditions (e.g., inflation, interest rates, etc.)

about known product safety issues are covered under the Product

and change behaviors accordingly (Fu et al., 2021). And contrary to

Safety & Quality KPI. This indicator also includes business involve-

what we hypothesized, in situations of high environmental uncer-

ment in alcohol.

tainty, differentiation (or the lack of imitation) can be a risky strategy

ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES (PRO-CON-E)

(Lieberman & Asaba, 2006), especially for business conduct toward

This indicator measures the severity of controversies related to a

an essential stakeholder such as consumers (Fu et al., 2021). That is,

firm's anti-competitive business practices. Topics covered include,

the level of financial, social, political, or climate risk a firm may tolerate

for example, price-fixing, collusion, bid-rigging, and predatory pric-

may influence a firm's propensity to imitate others' behaviors (Bryant

ing. Business-to-business claims are generally not covered unless a

et al., 2020) and in turn, propagate harmful behaviors toward consum-

regulator joins the suit. Likewise, standard pre-merger regulatory

ers (consumer-related risks) as we argue in this paper.

inquiries are not considered controversial.

Because of the potential for additional underlying mechanisms affect-

CUSTOMER RELATIONS (PRO-CON-F)

ing the uptake, imitation, and proliferation of irresponsible consumer-

This indicator measures the severity of controversies related to

related practices, we explore additional interactions using Generalized

how a firm treats its customers or potential customers. Topics cov-

Estimating Equations (GEE) as a post hoc analysis. The interactions se-

ered include, for example, fraudulent or improper billing, excessive

lected were based on the significant effects of several control variables

or hidden fees, predatory financial products, and restricted or dis-

in Model 3 (rather than theorizing interaction relationships) and there-

criminatory access to products or services. Customer privacy and

fore should not be considered to be hypothesized a priori.

data security issues are covered under the Privacy & Data Security
KPI.

The analyses in Tables A1 and A2 parallel our Robustness of
Results section. We replaced the variable firm size with four alter-

PRO-CON-G: PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY^

native variables: capital intensity (Model GEE 3), advertising expense

This indicator measures the severity of controversies related to a

(Model GEE 4), risk tolerance (Model GEE 5), and firm's prior irrespon-

firm's privacy and data security practices. Issues covered include, for

sible behavior (Model GEE 6) in the interaction with peers' irresponsi-

example, controversial legal uses of personal data, security breaches,

ble behavior to ascertain their effect on firm's irresponsible behavior.

regulatory action against the company, and changes to a company's

While none of the replacement interactions are significant (α = .05),

policies or practices that erode customer privacy.

it is worth highlighting that the interaction of advertising expense

OTHER CONCERNS (PRO-CON-X )

(βPeer*AdvExpens = −2.20, p = .052) with peers' irresponsible behavior

This indicator is designed to assess the severity of customer-

in Model GEE 4 is significant and negative at less stringent signifi-

related controversies not covered by any other MSCI ESG Research

cance standard (α = .10). This interaction may indicate that firms that

negative social indicator.

rely heavily on advertising may avoid irresponsible consumer-related

*These measure definitions are quoted from MSCI ESG
Research (2016, pp. 37–39).

behavior as a differentiation strategy when peers' irresponsible
consumer-related behavior is high. More theorizing on the mecha-

^This measure was introduced in the 2015 data set with 0.6% and

nisms underlying and the competitive context in which firms that

0.4% of the firms marked as having privacy & data security concerns

rely heavily on advertising (c.f. consumer-facing industries) might

in 2015 and 2016, respectively.

avoid harmful consumer-facing behavior is warranted.
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TA B L E A 1 Generalized estimating equations using alternative interactions
Total observations (n) = 25,824

GEE 3 –Binary

GEE 4 –Binary

Firm-year “yes” pct. = 14.1%

Dependent variable: Irresponsible
behavior yes (vs no)

Dependent variable: Irresponsible
behavior yes (vs no)

Parameters

Estimate

SE

p-value

Estimate

SE

p-value

Intercept

−7.604

0.600

<.0001

−7.581

0.600

<.0001

Peer irresponsible behavior

−0.768

0.704

.276

−0.572

0.650

.378

Firm size: ln(sales)

0.470

0.025

<.0001

0.469

0.025

<.0001

−0.806

0.421

.056

0.951

0.711

.181

Capital intensity

−0.823

0.433

.057

Capital intensity × Peer irresponsible
behavior

0.312

1.284

.808

Peer responsible behavior

0.907

0.716

.205

Sector growth

−0.082

0.047

.081

−0.082

0.047

.079

R&D expense

0.112

0.059

.058

0.086

0.061

.159

Advertising expense

0.154

0.104

.140

Advertising expense × Peer irresponsible
behavior
Risk tolerance

0.559

0.228

.014

−2.197

1.132

.052

0.668

0.153

<.0001

0.669

0.153

<.0001

0.234

0.301

.437

0.246

0.301

.414

Risk tolerance × Peer irresponsible
behavior
Profit: Return on assets
Profit: Earnings per share

−0.006

0.007

.391

−0.006

0.007

.383

Profit: Dividends per share

−0.030

0.029

.300

−0.029

0.029

.316

Firm responsible behavior

0.136

0.103

.186

0.134

0.102

.189

Firm irresponsible behavior

4.544

0.076

<.0001

4.539

0.076

<.0001

Firm irresponsible behavior × Peer
irresponsible behavior
Year fixed effects (2004–2015)

Included

Included

Sector fixed effects

Included

Included

Correlation structure

Autoregressive (1)

Autoregressive (1)

Distribution

Binary

Binary

Link

Logistic

Logistic

GEE details

Note: Newly added interactions are in bold, all variables listed with enumerated parameter estimates were lagged by 1 year. Standard errors (SE) and
p-values are based on empirical standard error estimates.
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TA B L E A 2 Generalized estimating equations using alternative interactions
Total observations (n) = 25,824

GEE 5 –Binary

GEE 6 –Binary

Firm-year “yes” pct. = 14.1%

Dependent variable: Irresponsible behavior yes
(vs no)

Dependent variable: Irresponsible behavior
yes (vs no)

Parameters

Estimate

SE

p-value

Estimate

SE

p-value

Intercept

−7.669

0.609

<.0001

−7.571

0.615

<.0001

Peer irresponsible behavior

−0.385

0.776

.620

−0.920

0.767

.231

Firm Size: ln(sales)

0.470

0.025

<.0001

0.471

0.025

<.0001

Capital intensity

−0.851

0.420

.043

−0.849

0.421

.044

0.931

0.709

.189

0.909

0.710

.201

Capital intensity × Peer irresponsible
behavior
Peer responsible behavior
Sector growth

−0.082

0.047

.083

−0.082

0.047

.081

R&D expense

0.113

0.059

.058

0.112

0.060

.060

Advertising expense

0.153

0.105

.142

0.155

0.104

.137

Risk tolerance

0.837

0.290

.004

0.668

0.153

<.0001

Risk tolerance × Peer irresponsible
behavior

−1.160

1.536

.450

Profit: Return on assets

0.228

0.302

.451

0.234

0.301

.437

Advertising expense × Peer irresponsible
behavior

Profit: Earnings per share

−0.006

0.007

.386

−0.006

0.007

.401

Profit: Dividends per share

−0.030

0.029

.300

−0.030

0.029

.300

Firm responsible behavior

0.137

0.103

.184

0.136

0.103

.187

Firm irresponsible behavior

4.545

0.076

<.0001

4.469

0.148

<.0001

0.433

0.774

.576

Firm irresponsible behavior × Peer
irresponsible behavior
Year fixed effects (2004–2015)

Included

Included

Sector fixed effects

Included

Included

Correlation structure

Autoregressive (1)

Autoregressive (1)

Distribution

Binary

Binary

Link

Logistic

Logistic

GEE details

Note: Newly added interactions are bolded, all variables listed with enumerated parameter estimates were lagged by 1 year. Standard errors (SE) and
p-values are based on empirical standard error estimates.
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